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Quality distortions in vertical relations

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  • Baake, Pio
  • von Schlippenbach, Vanessa

Abstract

This paper examines how delivery tariffs and private quality standards are determined in vertical relations that are subject to asymmetric information. We consider an infinitely repeated game where an upstream firm sells a product to a downstream firm. In each period, the firms negotiate a delivery contract comprising the quality of the good as well as a nonlinear tariff. Assuming asymmetric information about the actual quality of the product and focusing on incentive compatible contracts, we show that from the firms' perspective delivery contracts lead to more efficient contracts and thus higher overall profits the lower the firms' outside options, i.e. the higher their mutual dependency. Buyer power driven by a reduced outside option of the upstream firm enhances the efficiency of vertical relations, while buyer power due to an improved outside option of the downstream firm implies less effcient outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Baake, Pio & von Schlippenbach, Vanessa, 2011. "Quality distortions in vertical relations," DICE Discussion Papers 18, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:dicedp:18
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Müller, Jo-Ann, 2016. "Subsidiary Strategy and Importance of Standards: Re-interpreting the integration-responsiveness framework," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145896, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Gu, Yiquan & Wenzel, Tobias, 2012. "Transparency, entry, and productivity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 7-10.
    3. Yoo, Seung Ho & Cheong, Taesu, 2018. "Quality improvement incentive strategies in a supply chain," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 331-342.
    4. Haucap, Justus & Herr, Annika & Frank, Björn, 2011. "In vino veritas: Theory and evidence on social drinking," DICE Discussion Papers 37, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    5. Clémence Christin, 2013. "Entry Deterrence Through Cooperative R&D Over-Investment," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 79(2), pages 5-26.
    6. Stühmeier Torben & Wenzel Tobias, 2012. "Regulating Advertising in the Presence of Public Service Broadcasting," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(2), pages 1-23, June.
    7. Jing Mu & Jing Li & Yaze Li & Chao Liu, 2021. "The Dynamics of Brand-Driven Quality Improvement Decision-Making in Multi-Small-Supplier Agri-Food Supply Chain: The Case of China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(19), pages 1-17, September.
    8. Hiroshi Kitamura & Misato Sato & Koki Arai, 2014. "Exclusive contracts when the incumbent can establish a direct retailer," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 112(1), pages 47-60, May.
    9. EuiBeom Jeong & GeunWan Park & Seung Ho Yoo, 2019. "Incentive Mechanism for Sustainable Improvement in a Supply Chain," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(13), pages 1-18, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Quality Uncertainty; Private Standards; Vertical Relations; Buyer Power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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