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Enlargement of the European Union and the approximation of law: Lessons from an economic theory of optimal legal areas

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  • Schmidt-Trenz, Hans-Jörg
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter

Abstract

Before joining the European Union countries from Central and Eastern Europe have to adopt the acquis communautaire, i.e. the system of legal rules developed in the Union. The paper outlines an economic theory of optimum legal areas, that is used to determine the optimal size of the Union as well as winners and losers of enlargement. The model also allows to identify an applicants dilemma: by adopting the acquis potential entrants reduce the probability of admittance to the club.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmidt-Trenz, Hans-Jörg & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1999. "Enlargement of the European Union and the approximation of law: Lessons from an economic theory of optimal legal areas," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 99-08, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:9908
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constitutional economics; social contract theory; optimum legal area; enlargement of the EU;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law

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