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CDOs and systematic risk: Why bond ratings are inadequate

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  • Krahnen, Jan Pieter
  • Wilde, Christian

Abstract

This paper analyzes the risk properties of typical asset-backed securities (ABS), like CDOs or MBS, relying on a model with both macroeconomic and idiosyncratic components. The examined properties include expected loss, loss given default, and macro factor dependencies. Using a two-dimensional loss decomposition as a new metric, the risk properties of individual ABS tranches can directly be compared to those of corporate bonds, within and across rating classes. By applying Monte Carlo Simulation, we find that the risk properties of ABS differ significantly and systematically from those of straight bonds with the same rating. In particular, loss given default, the sensitivities to macroeconomic risk, and model risk differ greatly between instruments. Our findings have implications for understanding the credit crisis and for policy making. On an economic level, our analysis suggests a new explanation for the observed rating inflation in structured finance markets during the pre-crisis period 2004-2007. On a policy level, our findings call for a termination of the 'one-size-fits-all' approach to the rating methodology for fixed income instruments, requiring an own rating methodology for structured finance instruments.

Suggested Citation

  • Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Wilde, Christian, 2009. "CDOs and systematic risk: Why bond ratings are inadequate," CFS Working Paper Series 2009/11, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cfswop:200911
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gunter Franke & Jan Pieter Krahnen, 2007. "Default Risk Sharing between Banks and Markets: The Contribution of Collateralized Debt Obligations," NBER Chapters, in: The Risks of Financial Institutions, pages 603-631, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. King, Gary & Zeng, Langche, 2001. "Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 137-163, January.
    3. Carey, Mark & Stulz, René M. (ed.), 2007. "The Risks of Financial Institutions," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226092850, August.
    4. Peter M. DeMarzo, 2005. "The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of Informed Intermediation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 18(1), pages 1-35.
    5. Ashcraft, Adam B. & Schuermann, Til, 2008. "Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 191-309, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Wilde, Christian, 2017. "Skin-in-the-game in ABS transactions: A critical review of policy options," SAFE White Paper Series 46, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    2. Lützenkirchen, Kristina & Rösch, Daniel & Scheule, Harald, 2013. "Ratings based capital adequacy for securitizations," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5236-5247.
    3. Günter Franke & Jan P. Krahnen, 2009. "Instabile Finanzmärkte," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 10(4), pages 335-366, November.
    4. Mählmann, Thomas, 2013. "Hedge funds, CDOs and the financial crisis: An empirical investigation of the “Magnetar trade”," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 537-548.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credit Risk; Risk Transfer; Systematic Risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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