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Insiders-outsiders, transparency and the value of the ticker

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  • Cespa, Giovanni
  • Foucault, Thierry

Abstract

We consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on past transaction prices (the ticker). Some investors (insiders) observe prices in real-time whereas other investors (outsiders) observe prices with a delay. As prices are informative about the asset payoff, insiders get a strictly larger expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other investors. Thus, investors' average welfare is maximal when access to price information is rationed. We show that a market for price information can implement the fraction of insiders that maximizes investors' average welfare. This market features a high price to curb excessive acquisition of ticker information. We also show that informational efficiency is greater when the dissemination of ticker information is broader and more timely.

Suggested Citation

  • Cespa, Giovanni & Foucault, Thierry, 2008. "Insiders-outsiders, transparency and the value of the ticker," CFS Working Paper Series 2008/39, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cfswop:200839
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Yacine Aït-Sahalia & Mehmet Saglam, 2013. "High Frequency Traders: Taking Advantage of Speed," NBER Working Papers 19531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Álvaro Cartea & José Penalva, 2012. "Where is the Value in High Frequency Trading?," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 2(03), pages 1-46.
    3. Le, Anh Tu & Le, Thai-Ha & Liu, Wai-Man & Fong, Kingsley Y., 2020. "Multiple duration analyses of dynamic limit order placement strategies and aggressiveness in a low-latency market environment," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    4. Giovanni Cespa & Xavier Vives, 2012. "Dynamic Trading and Asset Prices: Keynes vs. Hayek," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(2), pages 539-580.
    5. Espen Sirnes, 2011. "Why falling information costs may increase demand for index funds," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(1), pages 37-47, January.
    6. Ciamac C. Moallemi & Mehmet Sağlam, 2013. "OR Forum---The Cost of Latency in High-Frequency Trading," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 61(5), pages 1070-1086, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market Data Sales; Latency; Transparency; Price Discovery; Hirshleifer Effect;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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