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The Economic Limits of Bitcoin and the Blockchain

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  • Budish, Eric B.

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  • Budish, Eric B., 2018. "The Economic Limits of Bitcoin and the Blockchain," Working Papers 279, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:279
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/262681/1/wp279.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Athey, Susan & Parashkevov, Ivo & Sarukkai, Vishnu & Xia, Jing, 2016. "Bitcoin Pricing, Adoption, and Usage: Theory and Evidence," Research Papers 3469, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    2. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hanna Halaburda & Guillaume Haeringer & Joshua Gans & Neil Gandal, 2022. "The Microeconomics of Cryptocurrencies," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 971-1013, September.
    2. Auer, Raphael & Tercero-Lucas, David, 2022. "Distrust or speculation? The socioeconomic drivers of U.S. cryptocurrency investments," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    3. Dionysopoulos, Lambis & Marra, Miriam & Urquhart, Andrew, 2024. "Central bank digital currencies: A critical review," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    4. Jonathan Chiu & Thorsten V. Koeppl, 2022. "The economics of cryptocurrency: Bitcoin and beyond," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(4), pages 1762-1798, November.
    5. Matteo Benetton & Giovanni Compiani, 2024. "Investors’ Beliefs and Cryptocurrency Prices," The Review of Asset Pricing Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(2), pages 197-236.
    6. Emiliano S Pagnotta, 2022. "Decentralizing Money: Bitcoin Prices and Blockchain Security," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(2), pages 866-907.
    7. Francesca Carapella & Edward Dumas & Jacob Gerszten & Nathan Swem, 2022. "Decentralized Finance (DeFi): Transformative Potential and Associated Risks," Policy Hub, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 2022(14), October.
    8. Zhong Xu & Chuanwei Zou, 2021. "What can blockchain do and cannot do?," China Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(1), pages 4-25, January.
    9. Igor Makarov & Antoinette Schoar, 2022. "Cryptocurrencies and Decentralised Finance," BIS Working Papers 1061, Bank for International Settlements.
    10. Ferreira, Daniel & Li, Jin & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2023. "Corporate capture of blockchain governance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 115618, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    11. Jia, Dun & Li, Yifan, 2023. "Bounded pool mining and the bounded Bitcoin price," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    12. Francesca Carapella & Nathan Swem, 2022. "Decentralized Finance (DeFi): Transformative Potential & Associated Risks," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2022-057, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    13. Bertrand Crettez & Lisa Morhaim, 2022. "General equilibrium cryptocurrency pricing in an OLG model," Post-Print hal-04103599, HAL.
    14. Soria, Jorge & Moya, Jorge & Mohazab, Amin, 2023. "Optimal mining in proof-of-work blockchain protocols," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    15. Li, Zhicheng & Li, Jialong & Zhou, Ke, 2023. "Bitcoin transaction fees and the decentralization of Bitcoin mining pools," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(PB).
    16. Michael Sockin & Wei Xiong, 2023. "Decentralization through Tokenization," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 78(1), pages 247-299, February.
    17. David Cerezo Sánchez, 2022. "Pravuil: Global Consensus for a United World," FinTech, MDPI, vol. 1(4), pages 1-20, October.
    18. Podhorsky, Andrea, 2024. "Bursting the bitcoin bubble: Do market prices reflect fundamental bitcoin value?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).

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