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The fiscal footprint of macroprudential policy

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  • Reis, Ricardo

Abstract

Monetary policy leaves a fiscal footprint. In some circumstances, relieving the fiscal burden becomes the main goal of policy, and inflation control is subordinate. This article notes that the same is true of macroprudential policy, and it characterizes the size and sign of its fiscal footprint, as well as the states of the world in which the temptation for fiscal goals to dominate may be higher. Macroprudential policies that increase the demand for government bonds by banks directly lower the cost of rolling over public debt, but decrease lending, real activity, and tax collections. They lower the incidence and fiscal cost of a financial crisis, but they may make a fiscal crisis more likely.

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  • Reis, Ricardo, 2020. "The fiscal footprint of macroprudential policy," Discussion Papers 31/2020, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdps:312020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eric Monnet & Miklos Vari, 2023. "A Dilemma between Liquidity Regulation and Monetary Policy: Some History and Theory," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(4), pages 915-944, June.
    2. Goodhart, C. A. E. & Masciandaro, Donato & Ugolini, Stefano, 2021. "Pandemic recession, helicopter money and central banking: Venice, 1630," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 108555, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Masciandaro, Donato & Goodhart, Charles & Ugolini, Stefano, 2021. "Pandemic recession and helicopter money: Venice, 1629–1631," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 28(3), pages 300-318, December.
    4. Malmierca, María, 2023. "Optimal macroprudential and fiscal policy in a monetary union," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    5. Malmierca, María, 2022. "Stabilization and the policy mix in a monetary union," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 92-118.
    6. José E. Boscá & Javier Ferri & Margarita Rubio, 2022. "Fiscal and Macroprudential Policies in a Monetary Union," Working Papers 2022-08, FEDEA.
    7. Sever, Can & Yücel, Emekcan, 2022. "The effects of elections on macroprudential policy," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 507-533.
    8. Ma, Yong & Lv, Lin, 2022. "Money, debt, and the effects of fiscal stimulus," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 152-178.
    9. Can Sever & Emekcan Yucel, 2020. "Macroprudential Policy and Elections: What Matters? Abstract:," Working Papers 2020/01, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    financial crisis; sovereign default; diabolic loop; capital and liquidity regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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