Optimal Trading Mechanisms for an Informed Seller
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
informed principal; mechanism design;JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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