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Incomplete Information and Multiple Machine Queueing Problems

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  • Mitra, Manipushpak

Abstract

In mechanism design problems under incomplete information, it is generally difficult to find decision problems that are first best implementable. A decision problem under incomplete information is first best implementable if there exists a mechanism that extracts the private information and achieves efficiency with a transfer scheme that adds up to zero in every state. One such problem is the queueing problem with one machine. In this paper we identify the conditions on cost structure for which queueing problems with multiple machines are first best implementable.

Suggested Citation

  • Mitra, Manipushpak, 2001. "Incomplete Information and Multiple Machine Queueing Problems," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 19/2001, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bonedp:192001
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    Cited by:

    1. Atay, Ata & Trudeau, Christian, 2024. "Queueing games with an endogenous number of machines," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 104-125.
    2. Mitra, Manipushpak & Mutuswami, Suresh, 2011. "Group strategyproofness in queueing models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 242-254, May.
    3. Dominik Kress & Sebastian Meiswinkel & Erwin Pesch, 2018. "Mechanism design for machine scheduling problems: classification and literature overview," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 40(3), pages 583-611, July.
    4. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2012. "Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 473-480, March.
    5. Leticia Lorenzo, 2019. "Comments on: recent developments in the queueing problem," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 27(1), pages 28-30, April.
    6. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2008. "Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Rule in Queueing Problems: A Relationship between Equity and Efficiency," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 08-17, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    7. Youngsub Chun & Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2019. "Recent developments in the queueing problem," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 27(1), pages 1-23, April.
    8. Sreoshi Banerjee & Parikshit De & Manipushpak Mitra, 2024. "Generalized welfare lower bounds and strategyproofness in sequencing problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(2), pages 323-357, September.
    9. Slikker, Marco, 2006. "Balancedness of multiple machine sequencing games revisited," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 174(3), pages 1944-1949, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Queueing Problems; First Best Implementability;

    JEL classification:

    • C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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