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An analysis of the German university admissions system

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  • Westkamp, Alexander

Abstract

This paper analyzes the sequential admissions procedure for medical subjects at public universities in Germany. Complete information equilibrium outcomes are shown to be characterized by a \emph{stability} condition that is adapted to the \emph{institutional constraints} of the German system. I introduce \emph{matching problems with complex constraints} and the notion of \emph{procedural stability}. Two simple assumptions guarantee existence of a student optimal procedurally stable matching mechanism that is strategyproof for students. n the context of the German admissions problem, this mechanism weakly Pareto dominates all equilibrium outcomes of the currently employed procedure. Applications to school choice with affirmative action are also discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Westkamp, Alexander, 2012. "An analysis of the German university admissions system," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 02/2012, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bonedp:022012
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/74644/1/74743543X.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Westkamp, 2013. "An analysis of the German university admissions system," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(3), pages 561-589, August.
    2. Haeringer, Guillaume & Iehlé, Vincent, 2021. "Gradual college admission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    3. Péter Biró & Sofya Kiselgof, 2015. "College admissions with stable score-limits," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 23(4), pages 727-741, December.
    4. Dur, Umut & Zhang, Yanning, 2023. "Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    5. Jiarui Xie, 2024. "Games under the Tiered Deferred Acceptance Mechanism," Papers 2406.00455, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    6. Vincent Iehlé, 2016. "Gradual College Admisssion," Post-Print halshs-02367006, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    University Admissions; Matching; Stability; Strategyproofness; Complex Constraints;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact

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