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Is zero the best price? Optimal pricing of mobile applications

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  • Buck, Christoph
  • Graf, Julia

Abstract

[Introduction ...] This leads us to our major research question: How to optimally set prices of mobile applications depending on their utility-classification? Each of the following chapters sequentially contributes to the answer of this question. Chapter 2 focuses on the managerial relevance of pricing and the specific characteristics of mobile applications. In chapter 3, we develop a model for mobile application pricing and derive advises for profit-maximizing mobile application pricing. The article closes with a discussion and conclusion in chapter 4.

Suggested Citation

  • Buck, Christoph & Graf, Julia, 2015. "Is zero the best price? Optimal pricing of mobile applications," Bayreuth Reports on Information Systems Management 60, University of Bayreuth, Chair of Information Systems Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bayism:60
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Optimal Pricing; Mobile Applications; Apps; Price;
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