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James M. Buchanan's contractarianism and modern liberalism

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  • Vanberg, Viktor J.

Abstract

[Conclusion] Hayek has been rightly praised for his most important role in the modern revival of classical liberalism. I want to submit, though, that a truly 'modern' liberalism must fill a void in the classical liberal tradition that Hayek only started to address, namely to complement the well-developed liberal theory of the market by a consistent liberal theory of democracy. As I have argued above, to have shown how this void may be filled is the specific contribution of James Buchanan to a modern liberalism. It is not the least important feature of his contractarian-constitutionalist approach that it draws attention to the fact that markets and politics are both to be judged in terms of their capacity to allow the individuals involved to realize mutual gains, and that - in contrasting market and democracy - we must keep in mind that there is neither a 'market as such' nor a 'democracy as such.' Both, markets and democracies exist only as arenas for social cooperation that are framed by specific 'rules of the game' and their working properties will be critically dependent on the nature of these rules. Accordingly, liberals who care about how the prospects for individuals to realize mutual gains, in the market arena as well as in politics, might be improved, should focus their research ambitions on comparing specific institutional alternatives for how social cooperation may be organized in both these realms.

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  • Vanberg, Viktor J., 2013. "James M. Buchanan's contractarianism and modern liberalism," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 13/4, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:aluord:134
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Viktor Vanberg, 2011. "Liberal constitutionalism, constitutional liberalism and democracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 1-20, March.
    2. Buchanan, James M, 1987. "The Constitution of Economic Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 243-250, June.
    3. Vanberg, Viktor J., 2005. "Market and state: the perspective of constitutional political economy," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 23-49, June.
    4. José Casas Pardo & Pedro Schwartz (ed.), 2007. "Public Choice and the Challenges of Democracy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12578.
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    6. von Mises, Ludwig, 1957. "Theory and History," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, edition 1, number mises1957.
    7. von Mises, Ludwig, 1985. "Liberalism in the Classical Tradition," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number mises1985.
    8. Viktor Vanberg, 1999. "Markets and Regulation: On the Contrast Between Free-Market Liberalism and Constitutional Liberalism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 219-243, October.
    9. Brandi, Clara & Wohlgemuth, Michael, 2006. "Strategies of Flexible Integration and Enlargement of the European Union: a Club-theoretical and Constitutional Economics Perspective," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 06/7, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
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    Cited by:

    1. Manuel Woersdoerfer, 2023. "AI Ethics and Ordoliberalism 2.0: Towards A 'Digital Bill of Rights'," Papers 2311.10742, arXiv.org.

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