IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/yor/yorken/22-02.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

An Efficient and Strategy-Proof Multi-Item Ascending Auction under Financial Constraints

Author

Listed:
  • Zaifu Yang
  • Jingsheng Yu

Abstract

This paper proposes an ascending auction for selling multiple heterogeneous indivisible items to several potential bidders. Every bidder demands at most one item and faces a budget constraint. His valuations and budget are private information. Budget constraints may lead to the failure of competitive equilibrium. Bidders are not assumed to behave as price-takers and may therefore act strategically. We prove that the auction always induces bidders to bid truthfully and finds a strongly Pareto efficient core allocation when bidders are budget constrained, otherwise a Walrasian equilibrium with the minimum equilibrium price vector.

Suggested Citation

  • Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu, 2022. "An Efficient and Strategy-Proof Multi-Item Ascending Auction under Financial Constraints," Discussion Papers 22/02, Department of Economics, University of York.
    • Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:22/02
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.york.ac.uk/media/economics/documents/discussionpapers/2022/2202.pdf
    File Function: Main text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Andrew MACKENZIE & Yu ZHOU, 2022. "Tract Housing, The Core, And Pendulum Auctions," Discussion papers e-22-005, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ascending auction; core; equilibrium; budget constraint; incentive; assignment market.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:22/02. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Paul Hodgson (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deyoruk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.