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Risk Sharing, the Cost of Equity and the Optimal Capital Structure of the Regulated Firm

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  • Clive J Stones

Abstract

This paper considers the relationship between the regulator's pricing decision and the allocation of risk between consumers and shareholders. Consumers are willing to trade-off price variations against a lower expected price. Prices are higher in adverse economic conditions but shareholder returns are not necessarily lower. It might be optimal to insure shareholders against market risk to achieve a lower expected price. The socially optimal capital structure depends on consumers' and shareholders' attitudes to risk. There is only one very special set of conditions where the social optimum is 100% debt finance with the firm operating ona 'not-for-profit' basis.

Suggested Citation

  • Clive J Stones, "undated". "Risk Sharing, the Cost of Equity and the Optimal Capital Structure of the Regulated Firm," Discussion Papers 05/31, Department of Economics, University of York.
  • Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:05/31
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dasgupta, Sudipto & Nanda, Vikram, 1993. "Bargaining and brinkmanship : Capital structure choice by regulated firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 475-497.
    2. Yossef Spiegel & Daniel F. Spulber, 1997. "Capital Structure with Countervailing Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 1-24, Spring.
    3. Gianni De Fraja & Clive Stones, 2004. "Risk and Capital Structure in the Regulated Firm," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 69-84, July.
    4. John Lintner, 1965. "Security Prices, Risk, And Maximal Gains From Diversification," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 20(4), pages 587-615, December.
    5. Spiegel, Yossef, 1994. "The Capital Structure and Investment of Regulated Firms under Alternative Regulatory Regimes," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 297-319, September.
    6. Cowan, Simon, 2004. "Optimal risk allocation for regulated monopolies and consumers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1-2), pages 285-303, January.
    7. William F. Sharpe, 1964. "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory Of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions Of Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 19(3), pages 425-442, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Carlo Cambini & Yossi Spiegel, 2016. "Investment and Capital Structure of Partially Private Regulated Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 487-515, April.
    2. Spiegel, Yossi & Cambini, Carlo, 2011. "Investment and capital structure of partially private regulated firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 8508, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Singh, Kewal & Singh, Anoop & Prakash, Puneet, 2022. "Estimating the cost of equity for the regulated energy and infrastructure sectors in India," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation; gearing; leverage; debt finance; equity finance.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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