Optimal Incentives in Dynamic Multiple Project Contracts
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Cited by:
- Szydlowski, Martin, 2019.
"Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
- Martin Szydlowski, 2012. "Incentives, Project Choice and Dynamic Multitasking," Discussion Papers 1525, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Martin Szydlowski, 2014. "Incentives, Project Choice, and Dynamic Multitasking," 2014 Meeting Papers 1240, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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More about this item
Keywords
Dynamic Contracts; Multitask; Foreign Aid;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
- F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2007-05-19 (Business Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2007-05-19 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PPM-2007-05-19 (Project, Program and Portfolio Management)
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