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Power indices taking into account agents' preferences

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  • Aleskerov, Fuad

    (State University 'Higher School of Economics' and Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences)

Abstract

A set of new power indices is introduced extending Banzhaf power index and allowing to take into account agents’ preferences to coalesce. An axiomatic characterization of intensity functions representing a desire of agents to coalesce is given. A set of axioms for new power indices is presented and discussed. An example of use of these indices for Russian parliament is given.

Suggested Citation

  • Aleskerov, Fuad, 2009. "Power indices taking into account agents' preferences," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 898, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:898
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dennis Leech, 2002. "Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 109(1), pages 375-397, January.
    2. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2001. "Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf Indices Revisited," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 26(1), pages 89-104, February.
    3. Leech, D., 2000. "Members' Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 583, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    4. Steven J. Brams, 1997. "Game Theory And Emotions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 9(1), pages 91-124, February.
    5. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Voting Power In The Governance Of The International Monetary Fund," Economic Research Papers 269354, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    6. Michael D. Intriligator, 1973. "A Probabilistic Model of Social Choice," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 40(4), pages 553-560.
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    Cited by:

    1. F. Aleskerov & N. Meshcheryakova & S. Shvydun, 2016. "Centrality measures in networks based on nodes attributes, long-range interactions and group influence," Papers 1610.05892, arXiv.org.
    2. Fuad Aleskerov, 2008. "Power distribution in the electoral body with an application to the Russian Parliament," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 11-2008, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    3. Fuad Aleskerov & Manfred Holler & Rita Kamalova, 2014. "Power distribution in the Weimar Reichstag in 1919–1933," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 215(1), pages 25-37, April.
    4. Fuad Aleskerov & Irina Gavrilenkova & Sergey Shvydun & Vyacheslav Yakuba, 2020. "Power Distribution in the Networks of Terrorist Groups: 2001–2018," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 399-424, June.
    5. Pavel Doležel, 2011. "Estimating the Efficiency of Voting in Big Size Committees," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 5(2), pages 172-190, August.
    6. Fuad Aleskerov & Natalia Meshcheryakova & Alisa Nikitina & Sergey Shvydun, 2016. "Key Borrowers Detection by Long-Range Interactions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 56/FE/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    7. Thimann, Christian & Reynaud, Julien & Gatarek, Lukasz, 2007. "Proximity and linkages among coalition participants: a new voting power measure applied to the International Monetary Fund," Working Paper Series 819, European Central Bank.
    8. Aleskerov, F. & Badgaeva, D. & Pislyakov, V. & Sterligov, I. & Shvydun, S., 2016. "An Importance of Russian and International Economic Journals: a Network Approach," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 193-205.
    9. Рубинштейн Александр Яковлевич, "undated". "Ранжирование Российских Экономических Журналов: Научный Метод Или «Игра В Цыфирь»? [Ran Ranking of Russian Economic Journals: The Scientific Method or “Numbers Game”?]," Working papers a:pru175:ye:2016:1, Institute of Economics.
    10. Matteo Migheli, 2016. "Measuring Representativeness in Different Electoral Systems, Using Italian and Dutch Data," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 723-748, July.
    11. Julien Reynaud & Fabien Lange & Łukasz Gątarek & Christian Thimann, 2011. "Proximity in Coalition Building," Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, vol. 3(3), pages 111-132, September.
    12. Fuad Aleskerov & Irina Andrievskaya & Elena Permjakova, 2014. "Key Borrowers Detected By The Intensities Of Their Short-range Interactions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 33/FE/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

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