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Leadership Cartels in Industries with Differentiated Products

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  • Posada, P.

Abstract

This article analyses cartels that act as a Stackelberg leader with respect to a competitive fringe in industries supplying differentiated products. The main objectives are to investigate how cartel stability changes with the degree of differentiation and the cartel size, to predict endogenous cartels and to carry out a welfare analysis. Both repeated and static games are considered as well as industries competing in quantities and prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Posada, P., 2001. "Leadership Cartels in Industries with Differentiated Products," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 590, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:590
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    File URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp590.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Majerus, David W., 1988. "Price vs. quantity competition in oligopoly supergames," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 293-297.
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    3. Avinash Dixit, 1979. "A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 20-32, Spring.
    4. Posada, P., 2000. "Cartel Stability and Product Differentiation: How Much Do the Size of the Cartel and the Size of the Industry Matter?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 556, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    5. Ross, Thomas W., 1992. "Cartel stability and product differentiation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 1-13, March.
    6. R. Rothschild, 1997. "Product differentiation and cartel stability: Chamberlin versus Hotelling," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 31(3), pages 259-271.
    7. Daniel F. Spulber, 1989. "Regulation and Markets," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262192756, April.
    8. Posada, Pedro, 2000. "Cartel Stability and Product Di¤erentiation: How Much Do the Size of the Cartel and the Size of the Industry Matter?," Economic Research Papers 269307, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    9. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    10. Curtis Eaton & Mukesh Eswaran, 1998. "Endogenous Cartel Formation," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(1), pages 1-13, March.
    11. Donsimoni, Marie-Paule & Economides, Nicholas S & Polemarchakis, Herakles M, 1986. "Stable Cartels," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(2), pages 317-327, June.
    12. Albaek, Svend & Lambertini, Luca, 1998. "Collusion in differentiated duopolies revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 305-308, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mariana Cunha & Paula Sarmento, 2014. "Does Vertical Integration Promote Downstream Incomplete Collusion? An Evaluation of Static and Dynamic Stability," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-38, March.
    2. Marc Escrihuela-Villar, 2009. "Does cartel leadership facilitate collusion?," DEA Working Papers 39, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    CARTELS ; GAMES ; COMPETITION ; SIZE OF INDUSTRY;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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