Product differentiation and cartel stability: Chamberlin versus Hotelling
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Note: Received: April 1995 / Accepted in revised form: October 1996
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Cited by:
- Hui Wen Cheng & Chin Wei Yang, 2013. "Some Taxation Theorems in the Hotelling Model," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(3-4), pages 143-158, December.
- Posada, Pedro, 2001. "Leadership Cartels in Industries with Differentiated Products," Economic Research Papers 269361, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Florian Gössl & Alexander Rasch, 2020. "Collusion under different pricing schemes," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 910-931, October.
- Yiquan Gu & Alexander Rasch & Tobias Wenzel, 2016.
"Price-sensitive demand and market entry,"
Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95(4), pages 865-875, November.
- Gu, Yiquan & Rasch, Alexander & Wenzel, Tobias, 2014. "Price-sensitive demand and market entry," DICE Discussion Papers 165, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Posada, P., 2000. "Cartel Stability and Product Differentiation: How Much Do the Size of the Cartel and the Size of the Industry Matter?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 556, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Rasch, Alexander & Gössl, Florian, 2016. "The scope for collusion under different pricing schemes," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145759, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Petrikaitė, Vaiva, 2016. "Collusion with costly consumer search," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 1-10.
- Rasch, Alexander & Herre, Jesko, 2013. "Customer-side transparency, elastic demand, and tacit collusion under differentiation," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 51-59.
- Posada, Pedro, 2000. "Cartel Stability and Product Di¤erentiation: How Much Do the Size of the Cartel and the Size of the Industry Matter?," Economic Research Papers 269307, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Posada, P., 2001. "Leadership Cartels in Industries with Differentiated Products," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 590, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Andaluz, Joaquín, 2010. "Cartel sustainability with vertical product differentiation: Price versus quantity competition," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(4), pages 201-211, December.
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