The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information
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Other versions of this item:
- Cripps, Martin W. & Thomas, Jonathan P., 1995. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games Of Incomplete Information," Economic Research Papers 268688, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
- Ehud Lehrer & Leeat Yariv, 1999. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information on One Side: The Case of Different Discount Factors," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 24(1), pages 204-218, February.
- Jimmy Chan, 2000. "On the Non-Existence of Reputation Effects in Two-Person Infinitely-Repeated Games," Economics Working Paper Archive 441, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
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