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Shedding light on El Farol

Author

Listed:
  • Damien Challet

    (Nomura Centre for Quantative Finance, Mathematical Institute, Oxford University, UK)

  • Matteo Marsili

    (Internation Center for Theoretical Physics, Trieste, Italy)

  • Gabriele Ottino

    (Département de Physique, Université de Fribourg, Switzerland)

Abstract

We mathematize El Farol bar problem and transform it into a workable model. We find general conditions under which the convergence of the average attendance to the resource level is trivial and does not even require any intelligence on the side of agents. Secondly, specializing to a particular ensemble of continuous strategies leads this problem to a model similar to the Minority Game. Statistical physics of disordered systems allows us to derive a complete understanding of the complex behavior of this model, on the basis of its phase diagram.

Suggested Citation

  • Damien Challet & Matteo Marsili & Gabriele Ottino, 2004. "Shedding light on El Farol," Game Theory and Information 0406002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0406002
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 8
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/0406/0406002.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Challet, Damien, 2008. "Inter-pattern speculation: Beyond minority, majority and $-games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 85-100, January.
    2. Shu-Heng Chen & Umberto Gostoli, 2017. "Coordination in the El Farol Bar problem: The role of social preferences and social networks," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 12(1), pages 59-93, April.
    3. Lustosa, Bernardo C. & Cajueiro, Daniel O., 2010. "Constrained information minority game: How was the night at El Farol?," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 389(6), pages 1230-1238.
    4. Benjamin Patrick Evans & Mikhail Prokopenko, 2022. "Bounded strategic reasoning explains crisis emergence in multi-agent market games," Papers 2206.05568, arXiv.org.
    5. Ritmeester, Tim & Meyer-Ortmanns, Hildegard, 2021. "Minority games played by arbitrageurs on the energy market," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 573(C).
    6. Tim Ritmeester & Hildegard Meyer-Ortmanns, 2020. "Minority games played by arbitrageurs on the energy market," Papers 2012.10475, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
    7. Duncan Whitehead, 2008. "The El Farol Bar Problem Revisited: Reinforcement Learning in a Potential Game," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 186, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    8. Zozor, S. & Ravier, P. & Buttelli, O., 2005. "On Lempel–Ziv complexity for multidimensional data analysis," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 345(1), pages 285-302.
    9. Matzke, Christina & Challet, Damien, 2008. "Taking a shower in Youth Hostels: risks and delights of heterogeneity," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 1/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    10. Shu-Heng Chen & Umberto Gostoli, 2011. "Agent-Based Modeling of the El Farol Bar Problem," ASSRU Discussion Papers 1120, ASSRU - Algorithmic Social Science Research Unit.
    11. Adão, Luiz F.S. & Silveira, Douglas & Ely, Regis A. & Cajueiro, Daniel O., 2022. "The impacts of interest rates on banks’ loan portfolio risk-taking," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    El Farol; Minority Game; resource level; biased strategies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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