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Matching games with partial information

Author

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  • Paolo Laureti Yi-Cheng Zhang

Abstract

We analyze different ways of pairing agents in a bipartite matching problem, with regard to its scaling properties and to the distribution of individual ``satisfactions''. Then we explore the role of partial information and bounded rationality in a generalized {\it Marriage Problem}, comparing the benefits obtained by self-searching and by a matchmaker. Finally we propose a modified matching game intended to mimic the way consumers' information makes firms to enhance the quality of their products in a competitive market.

Suggested Citation

  • Paolo Laureti Yi-Cheng Zhang, 2003. "Matching games with partial information," Game Theory and Information 0307002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0307002
    Note: Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on linux; to print on PostScript; pages: 19; figures: included. Published on Physica A 324(1- 2) 49-65 (2003)
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Enrico Maria Fenoaltea & Izat B. Baybusinov & Jianyang Zhao & Lei Zhou & Yi-Cheng Zhang, 2021. "The Stable Marriage Problem: an Interdisciplinary Review from the Physicist's Perspective," Papers 2103.11458, arXiv.org.
    2. Tilles, Paulo F.C. & Ferreira, Fernando F. & Francisco, Gerson & Pereira, Carlos de B. & Sarti, Flavia M., 2011. "A Markovian model market—Akerlof’s lemons and the asymmetry of information," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 390(13), pages 2562-2570.
    3. Shi, Gui-Yuan & Kong, Yi-Xiu & Liao, Hao & Zhang, Yi-Cheng, 2016. "Analysis of ground state in random bipartite matching," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 444(C), pages 397-402.
    4. André Veski & Kaire Põder, 2018. "Zero-intelligence agents looking for a job," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 13(3), pages 615-640, October.
    5. Fenoaltea, Enrico Maria & Baybusinov, Izat B. & Na, Xu & Zhang, Yi-Cheng, 2022. "A local interaction dynamic for the matching problem," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 604(C).
    6. Tao Jia & Robert F Spivey & Boleslaw Szymanski & Gyorgy Korniss, 2015. "An Analysis of the Matching Hypothesis in Networks," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(6), pages 1-12, June.
    7. Gui-Yuan Shi & Yi-Xiu Kong & Bo-Lun Chen & Guang-Hui Yuan & Rui-Jie Wu, 2018. "Instability in Stable Marriage Problem: Matching Unequally Numbered Men and Women," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2018, pages 1-5, September.
    8. Yi-Xiu Kong & Guang-Hui Yuan & Lei Zhou & Rui-Jie Wu & Gui-Yuan Shi, 2018. "Competition May Increase Social Utility in Bipartite Matching Problem," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2018, pages 1-7, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric information; Marriage Problem; Bounded rationality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis

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