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Competition May Increase Social Utility in Bipartite Matching Problem

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Listed:
  • Yi-Xiu Kong
  • Guang-Hui Yuan
  • Lei Zhou
  • Rui-Jie Wu
  • Gui-Yuan Shi

Abstract

Bipartite matching problem is to study two disjoint groups of agents who need to be matched pairwise. It can be applied to many real-world scenarios and explain many social phenomena. In this article, we study the effect of competition on bipartite matching problem by introducing conformity into the preference structure. The results show that a certain amount of competition can improve the overall utility of society and also eliminate the giant shift of social utility when matching unequal numbers of men and women.

Suggested Citation

  • Yi-Xiu Kong & Guang-Hui Yuan & Lei Zhou & Rui-Jie Wu & Gui-Yuan Shi, 2018. "Competition May Increase Social Utility in Bipartite Matching Problem," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2018, pages 1-7, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:hin:complx:4092056
    DOI: 10.1155/2018/4092056
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    10. Gui-Yuan Shi & Yi-Xiu Kong & Bo-Lun Chen & Guang-Hui Yuan & Rui-Jie Wu, 2018. "Instability in Stable Marriage Problem: Matching Unequally Numbered Men and Women," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2018, pages 1-5, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Enrico Maria Fenoaltea & Izat B. Baybusinov & Jianyang Zhao & Lei Zhou & Yi-Cheng Zhang, 2021. "The Stable Marriage Problem: an Interdisciplinary Review from the Physicist's Perspective," Papers 2103.11458, arXiv.org.

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