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Additive rules in bankruptcy problems and other related problems

Author

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  • Gustavo Bergantiños

    (University of Vigo)

  • Juan Vidal-Puga

    (University of Vigo)

Abstract

In this paper we characterize the set of rules satisfying additivity on the estate along with additivity on the estate and the claims in bankruptcy problems and other related problems. Moreover, new characterizations of the well known rules based on the principles of "equal award", "equal loss", and "proportionality" are provided using these additivity properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "Additive rules in bankruptcy problems and other related problems," Game Theory and Information 0304001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0304001
    Note: Type of Document - Tex; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on HP; pages: 19 ; figures: included
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2021. "Aggregator operators for dynamic rationing," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 288(2), pages 682-691.
    2. Bergantinos, Gustavo & Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2006. "Additive rules in discrete allocation problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 172(3), pages 971-978, August.
    3. Sánchez-Pérez, J. & Plata-Pérez, L. & Accinelli-Gamba, E., 2015. "Characterization of linear symmetric solutions for allocation problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 9-12.
    4. María Gómez-Rúa, 2013. "Sharing a polluted river through environmental taxes," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 137-153, June.
    5. Morgenstern, Ilan & Domínguez, Diego, 2019. "A characterization of the random arrival rule for bankruptcy problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 214-217.
    6. Lina Mallozzi & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2021. "Uncertainty in cooperative interval games: how Hurwicz criterion compatibility leads to egalitarianism," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 301(1), pages 143-159, June.
    7. Ricardo Martínez & Juan D. Moreno‐Ternero, 2024. "Redistribution with needs," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(1), February.
    8. Sanchez-Soriano, Joaquin, 2021. "Families of sequential priority rules and random arrival rules with withdrawal limits," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 136-148.
    9. Arin, J. & Benito-Ostolaza, J. & Inarra, E., 2017. "The reverse Talmud family of rules for bankruptcy Problems: A characterization," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 43-49.
    10. Jaume García-Segarra & Miguel Ginés-Vilar, 2023. "Additive adjudication of conflicting claims," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 93-116, March.
    11. María Gómez-Rúa, 2012. "Sharing a polluted river network through environmental taxes," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(1), pages 992-1000.
    12. Ju, Biung-Ghi & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2007. "Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 1-26, January.
    13. Thomson, William, 2015. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: An update," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 41-59.
    14. Patrick Harless, 2017. "Endowment additivity and the weighted proportional rules for adjudicating conflicting claims," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(3), pages 755-781, March.
    15. Karol Flores-Szwagrzak & Jaume García-Segarra & Miguel Ginés-Vilar, 2020. "Priority and proportionality in bankruptcy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 559-579, April.
    16. Elisenda Molina & Juan Tejada & Tom Weiss, 2022. "Some game theoretic marketing attribution models," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 1043-1075, November.
    17. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Additivity in cost spanning tree problems," Game Theory and Information 0405001, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    implementation levels coalition structure;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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