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The Strong Sequential Core in a Dynamic Exchange Economy

Author

Listed:
  • Arkadi Predtetchinski

    (University of Maastricht)

  • P. Jean-Jacques Herings

    (University of Maastricht)

  • Hans Peters

    (University of Maastricht)

Abstract

Dynamic exchange economies with uncertainty are considered where the information is released over infinite time. The strong sequential core of such an economy consists of those consumption streams that can be improved upon by no coalition at no moment of time. Non-emptiness of the strong sequential core is established given a high enough discount factor. Moreover, sufficient conditions are given under which the strong sequential core contains only time and history independent consumption streams. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Arkadi Predtetchinski & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Hans Peters, 2002. "The Strong Sequential Core in a Dynamic Exchange Economy," Game Theory and Information 0205004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0205004
    Note: Type of Document - .ps; pages: 20
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gonzalez, Stéphane & Rostom, Fatma Zahra, 2022. "Sharing the global outcomes of finite natural resource exploitation: A dynamic coalitional stability perspective," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-10.
    2. Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007. "The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 50-66, October.
    3. Stéphane Gonzalez & Fatma Rostom, 2019. "Sharing the Global Benefits of Finite Natural Resource Exploitation: A Dynamic Coalitional Stability Perspective," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02430751, HAL.
    4. Leonidas C. Koutsougeras, 2022. "Coalitions with limited coordination," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(2), pages 439-456, April.
    5. Hellman, Ziv, 2008. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 8798, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Ehud Lehrer & Marco Scarsini, 2013. "On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 359-373, September.
    7. Ziv Hellman, 2009. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Repeated Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper Series dp523, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    core; stationary economies; uncertainty;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets

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