Courts, firms and allocation of credit
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More about this item
Keywords
law enforcement; finance;JEL classification:
- O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2005-10-08 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-FIN-2005-10-08 (Finance)
- NEP-LAW-2005-10-08 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2005-10-08 (Public Economics)
- NEP-REG-2005-10-08 (Regulation)
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