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Imposed institutions and preferences for redistribution §

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  • CHONG, ALBERTO
  • GRADSTEIN, MARK

Abstract

To what extent do imposed institutions shape preferences? We consider this issue by comparing the market-versus-state attitudes of respondents from a capitalist country, Finland, and from an ex-communist group of Baltic countries, and by arguing that the period of communist rule can be viewed as an ‘experiment’ in institutional imposition. We find that, consistent with some earlier related work, citizens from ex-communist countries tend to be more supportive of state ownership than respondents from capitalist economies. However, they also favour increasing inequality and competition as the means to enhance incentives. We conclude that, in some important relevant dimensions, institutional imposition (which lasted for about 50 years) had a limited effect on preferences.

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  • Chong, Alberto & Gradstein, Mark, 2018. "Imposed institutions and preferences for redistribution §," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 127-156, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:14:y:2018:i:01:p:127-156_00
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    2. Frolov, Daniil, 2021. "Transplantation of economic institutions: a post-institutional theory (expanded version)," MPRA Paper 108707, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being
    • P30 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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