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Learning to Be Thoughtless: Social Norms and Individual Computation

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  • Joshua M. Epstein

Abstract

This paper extends the literature on the evolution of norms with an agent-based model capturing a phenomenon that has been essentially ignored, namely that individual thought--or computing--is often inversely related to the strength of a social norm. Once a norm is entrenched, we confirm thoughtlessly. In this model, agents learn how to behave (what norm to adopt), but--under a strategy I term Best Reply to Adaptive Sample Evidence--they also learn how much to think about how to behave. How much they're thinking affects how they behave, which--given how others behave--affects how much they think. In short, there is feedback between the social (inter-agent) anbd internal (intra-agent) dynamics. In addition, we generalte the stylized facts regarding the spatio-temporal evolution of norms: local conformity, global diversity, and punctuated equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua M. Epstein, 2000. "Learning to Be Thoughtless: Social Norms and Individual Computation," Working Papers 00-03-022, Santa Fe Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:wop:safiwp:00-03-022
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    1. Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote & José A. Scheinkman, 1996. "Crime and Social Interactions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(2), pages 507-548.
    2. Kenneth L. Judd, 1998. "Numerical Methods in Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262100711, December.
    3. David F. Scott & William G. Jens & Raymond E. Spudeck, 1991. "Analysis," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(6), pages 58-60, November.
    4. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    5. Canning, D., 1990. "Social Equilibrium," Papers 150, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
    6. David P. Feldman & James P. Crutchfield, 1997. "Measures of Statistical Complexity: Why?," Working Papers 97-07-064, Santa Fe Institute.
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    Cited by:

    1. J. Farmer & Cameron Hepburn & Penny Mealy & Alexander Teytelboym, 2015. "A Third Wave in the Economics of Climate Change," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(2), pages 329-357, October.
    2. Макаров В.Л., 2013. "Социальное Моделирование Набирает Обороты," Журнал Экономика и математические методы (ЭММ), Центральный Экономико-Математический Институт (ЦЭМИ), vol. 49(4), pages 5-17, октябрь.
    3. Corinna Elsenbroich & Maria Xenitidou, 2012. "Three kinds of normative behaviour: minimal requirements for feedback models," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 113-127, March.

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    Keywords

    Agent-based computational economics; evolution of norms.;

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