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How to Design an Optimal Rate Covenant in a Standard Debt Contract. An Application of the Risk-Sharing Paradigm

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  • Franz R. Hahn

    (WIFO)

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  • Franz R. Hahn, 2001. "How to Design an Optimal Rate Covenant in a Standard Debt Contract. An Application of the Risk-Sharing Paradigm," WIFO Working Papers 153, WIFO.
    • Handle: RePEc:wfo:wpaper:y:2001:i:153
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    File URL: https://www.wifo.ac.at/wwa/pubid/20524
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
    3. Allen, Franklin & Santomero, Anthony M., 1997. "The theory of financial intermediation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(11-12), pages 1461-1485, December.
    4. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 115-138.
    5. Scholtens, Bert & van Wensveen, Dick, 2000. "A critique on the theory of financial intermediation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(8), pages 1243-1251, August.
    6. Oliver Hart, 2001. "Financial Contracting," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1079-1100, December.
    7. Kreps, David M., 1990. "Game Theory and Economic Modelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283812, Decembrie.
    8. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, December.
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