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Family Control and the Rent-Seeking Society

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  • Randall Morck
  • Bernard Yeung

Abstract

The small number of very large family-controlled corporate groups in many countries combined with their long continuity of control and ability to act discretely give these organizations a comparative advantage in political rent-seeking. This advantage is a key part of a self-reinforcing system whereby oligarchic family corporate control, political rent seeking, and low general levels of trust combine to stymie growth.

Suggested Citation

  • Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2003. "Family Control and the Rent-Seeking Society," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 585, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    • Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2003-585
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Randall Morck, 2011. "Finance and Governance in Developing Economies," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 375-406, December.
    2. Bernard Yeung & Randall Morck & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2004. "Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth," Working Papers 04-21, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    3. Wen-Hsien Tsai & Yi-Chen Kuo & Jung-Hua Hung, 2009. "Corporate diversification and CEO turnover in family businesses: self-entrenchment or risk reduction?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 57-76, January.
    4. Heitor Almeida & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2005. "A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups," NBER Working Papers 11368, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Block, Joern & Spiegel, Frank, 2011. "Family Firms and Regional Innovation Activity: Evidence from the German Mittelstand," MPRA Paper 28604, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Block, Jörn Hendrich, 2008. "Family management, family ownership and downsizing: Evidence from S&P 500 firms," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2008-023, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    7. Claessens, Stijn & Perotti, Enrico, 2007. "Finance and inequality: Channels and evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 748-773, December.
    8. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2008-023 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Parsley, David & Faccio, Mara, 2006. "Sudden Deaths: Taking Stock of Political Connections," CEPR Discussion Papers 5460, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Mahmood, Ishtiaq P. & Zhu, Hong-Jin & Zajac, Edward J., 2008. "Where Can Capabilities Come From? How the Content of Network Ties Affects Capability Acquisition," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-14, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    11. Faccio, Mara & Parsley, David C., 2009. "Sudden Deaths: Taking Stock of Geographic Ties," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 683-718, June.
    12. Djankov, Simeon, 2008. "The Regulation of Entry: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 7080, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Morck, Randall & Yeung, Bernard, 2004. "Special issues relating to corporate governance and family control," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3406, The World Bank.
    14. Susan Perkins & Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2008. "Innocents Abroad: The Hazards of International Joint Ventures with Pyramidal Group Firms," NBER Working Papers 13914, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Mehrotra, Vikas & Morck, Randall & Shim, Jungwook & Wiwattanakantang, Yupana, 2013. "Adoptive expectations: Rising sons in Japanese family firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 840-854.
    16. Randall Morck, 2003. "Why Some Double Taxation Might Make Sense: The Special Case of Inter-corporate Dividends," NBER Working Papers 9651, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Evžen Kočenda & Jan Hanousek, 2012. "State ownership and control in the Czech Republic," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 157-191, August.
    18. Bjuggren, Per-Olof & Palmberg, Johanna, 2008. "Swedish Listed Family Firms and Entrepreneurial Spirit," Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation 147, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies.
    19. Fogel, Kathy & Morck, Randall & Yeung, Bernard, 2008. "Big business stability and economic growth: Is what's good for General Motors good for America?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 83-108, July.
    20. Williams, Jonathan & Nguyen, Nghia, 2005. "Financial liberalisation, crisis, and restructuring: A comparative study of bank performance and bank governance in South East Asia," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(8-9), pages 2119-2154, August.
    21. Levin, Mark (Левин, Марк) & Shilova, Nadezhda V. (Шилова, Надежда), 2016. "Rentseeking Behavior in Systems with a Complex Structure [Рентоориентированное Поведение В Системах Со Сложной Структурой]," Working Papers 2272, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    22. World Bank, 2005. "Philippines : From Short-Term Growth to Sustained Development," World Bank Publications - Reports 8552, The World Bank Group.

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