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Political determinants of fossil fuel pricing

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  • van Beers, Cees
  • Strand, Jon

Abstract

This paper provides an empirical analysis of economic and political determinants of gasoline and diesel prices for about 200 countries over the period 1991-2010. A range of both political and economic variables are found to systematically influence fuel prices, and in ways that differ systematically with countries’ per-capita income levels. For democracies, the analysis finds that fuel prices correlate positively with both duration of democracy and tenure of democratic leaders. In non-democratic societies there is more often no such relationship or it is the opposite of that for democracies. Regime switches -- transitions from non-democratic to democratic government, or vice versa -- reduce fuel prices. Fuel prices are also lower for more corrupt, or more centralized, governments. Higher levels of gross domestic product per capita lead to higher fuel prices, while export income from selling fossil fuels reduces these prices dramatically. Higher motor fuel consumption also appears to reduce fuel prices, most for gasoline. Absolute"pass-through"of crude oil price changes to fuel prices is found to be high on average.

Suggested Citation

  • van Beers, Cees & Strand, Jon, 2013. "Political determinants of fossil fuel pricing," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6470, The World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6470
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    Cited by:

    1. Morakinyo O. Adetutu & Thomas G. Weyman-Jones, 2019. "Fuel Subsidies Versus Market Power: Is There a Countervailing Second-Best Optimum?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(4), pages 1619-1646, December.
    2. Reagan Jean Jacques Molu & Wulfran Fendzi Mbasso & Serge Raoul Dzonde Naoussi & Saatong Tsobze Kenfack & Patrice Wira, 2022. "Investigating the Dependency between Electricity and the Human Development Based on Metaheuristic Optimization," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 12(5), pages 55-60, September.
    3. Kpodar, Kangni & Imam, Patrick Amir, 2021. "To pass (or not to pass) through international fuel price changes to domestic fuel prices in developing countries: What are the drivers?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
    4. Jeroen Klomp, 2020. "Subsidizing power," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 67(3), pages 300-321, July.
    5. Kpodar, Kangni & Abdallah, Chadi, 2017. "Dynamic fuel price pass-through: Evidence from a new global retail fuel price database," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 303-312.
    6. Ferraresi, Massimiliano & Kotsogiannis, Christos & Rizzo, Leonzio, 2018. "Decentralization and fuel subsidies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 275-286.
    7. Cecile Couharde & Sara Mouhoud, 2020. "Fossil Fuel Subsidies, Income Inequality, And Poverty: Evidence From Developing Countries," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(5), pages 981-1006, December.
    8. Therese E. Zogo & Christophe M. Mbassi & Simplice A. Asongu, 2024. "Coup d’état and access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa," Working Papers of the African Governance and Development Institute. 24/019, African Governance and Development Institute..
    9. Pani, Marco & Perroni, Carlo, 2018. "Energy subsidies and policy commitment in political equilibrium," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 149-160.
    10. Adams, Samuel & Klobodu, Edem Kwame Mensah & Opoku, Eric Evans Osei, 2016. "Energy consumption, political regime and economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 36-44.
    11. Mundaca, Gabriela, 2017. "How much can CO2 emissions be reduced if fossil fuel subsidies are removed?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 91-104.
    12. Guesmi, Khaled & Makrychoriti, Panagiota & Spyrou, Spyros, 2023. "The relationship between climate risk, climate policy uncertainty, and CO2 emissions: Empirical evidence from the US," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 610-628.
    13. Aluko, Olufemi Adewale & Opoku, Eric Evans Osei & Ibrahim, Muazu & Kufuor, Nana Kwabena, 2023. "Put on the light! Foreign direct investment, governance and access to electricity," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).

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    Keywords

    Energy Production and Transportation; Transport Economics Policy&Planning; Economic Theory&Research; Emerging Markets; Transport and Environment;
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