Dictatorships, Patronage and Public Good Provision: Some Empirics
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More about this item
Keywords
Dictatorship; Patronage; Public Goods Provision; Military Spending; Secondary School Enrolment Rate; Robustness Analysis;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
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