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Why multi-stakeholder groups succeed and fail

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  • Truex, Rory
  • Soreide, Tina

Abstract

Anti-corruption initiatives increasingly use multi-stakeholder groups, comprised of representatives from government, private sector, and civil society organizations, to drive implementation at the local level and serve as a force for transparency. In theory, the multi-stakeholder groups ideal is quite appealing -- each stakeholder has its own interest in the initiative and contributes its unique capacities. In practice, many multi-stakeholder groups have fallen short of expectations. This paper considers two separate but related questions. First, what are the unique barriers to implementation facing multi-stakeholder groups? Second, what policy measures can be taken to improve the likelihood that multi-stakeholder groups will succeed? The authors use existing research in political science and economics to develop a multi-level framework that accounts for the"nested nature"of multi-stakeholder groups. The framework is then applied to experiences of MSGs from the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative, a new pilot program that aims to promote transparency in construction through the release of material project information. The evidence shows that the barriers facing multi-stakeholder groups are substantial, but once the level (individual incentives, organizational dynamics, country context, or international pressures) of the challenge confronting a multi-stakeholder group is identified, the specific barrier, its root causes, and appropriate solutions can be identified. More broadly, the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative experiences suggest that multi-stakeholder groups are best used as a means of promoting dialogue and building consensus, not as the locus of policy implementation and oversight.

Suggested Citation

  • Truex, Rory & Soreide, Tina, 2010. "Why multi-stakeholder groups succeed and fail," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5495, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5495
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Anica Zeyen & Markus Beckmann & Stella Wolters, 2016. "Actor and Institutional Dynamics in the Development of Multi-stakeholder Initiatives," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 135(2), pages 341-360, May.
    2. Waligo, V.M. & Clarke, J. & Hawkins, R., 2014. "The ‘Leadership–Stakeholder Involvement Capacity’ nexus in stakeholder management," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 67(7), pages 1342-1352.

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