Political economy of policy reform in Turkey in the 1980s

Turkey's adjustment experience was a tremendous success in terms of structurally reorienting the economy. The share of output for export rose from 5 percent in 1979 to 23 percent in 1989, and real output roughly doubled. The financial markets opened and have developed depth and sophistication. The program failed to reduce fiscal deficits, inflation, income inequality, and the size of the inefficient public enterprise sector, but the transformation of trade and finance fundamentally altered the context of the problems, changing their effects on the private sector and changing the government's options for dealing with them. The first phase of economic adjustment was sustained, although not initiated, in an authoritarian context, but the Turks restored democracy when the agenda for reform was incomplete. The Motherland Party (ANAP) won office on the platform of economic success and eventally lost partly because of the failure of economic policy. ANAP's electoral defeat in 1991 did not mean, however, the demise of the pro-structural adjustment or the pro-liberalization coalitions. The long period of ANAP rule helped consolidate reforms to such a degree that all of the principal parties agreed on a broadly similar economic program. The ideological differences between the left and the right - a state-directed versus a marked-oriented economy - substantially diminished. The reforms of the early 1980s greatly reduced the importance of rent-seeking, particularly through foreign trade, but patronage politics became widespread again in the second half of the decade. The initial strength ANAP derived from privileged access to state resources progressively became a disadvantage, creating resentment and reaction among the populace. One source of discontent was the over-invoicing of exports (that is, fictitious exports), designed to take advantage of favorable export subsidies, and the government's failure to discipline or penalize the companies involved. This jeopardized attempts to build a pro-export coalition, and some key features of import substitution continued. The authors attribute the failure of Turkey's macroeconomic policies in the late 1980s to the government's failure tocultivate popular support for macroeconomic stability; to the top bureaucrats'lack of autonomy to counteract political pressures to expand the fiscal deficit; and to the continuation of top-down individualistic linkages between policymakers and key economic interests.