Poverty and Income Distribution in a High Growth Economy : The Case of Chile 1987-98, Volume 2. Background Papers
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- Florencia Torche & Luis F. Lopez-Calva, 2013.
"Stability and Vulnerability of the Latin American Middle Class,"
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- Florencia Torche & Luis F. López-Calva, 2012. "Stability and Vulnerability of the Latin American Middle Class," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2012-098, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
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Keywords
Social Protections and Labor - Safety Nets and Transfers Services and Transfers to Poor Poverty Reduction - Inequality Poverty Reduction - Rural Poverty Reduction Governance - Governance Indicators;Statistics
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