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Self-Dealing : Sneaking Corporate Value through the Back Door

Author

Listed:
  • Tatiana Nenova
  • Catherine Hickey

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Tatiana Nenova & Catherine Hickey, 2006. "Self-Dealing : Sneaking Corporate Value through the Back Door," World Bank Publications - Reports 11176, The World Bank Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wboper:11176
    as

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    File URL: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/11176/377100VP03120Nenova1Hickey.pdf?sequence=1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marianne Bertrand & Paras Mehta & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2002. "Ferreting out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 121-148.
    2. repec:bla:jfinan:v:59:y:2004:i:2:p:537-600 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Nenova, Tatiana, 2003. "The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 325-351, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Diathesopoulos, Michael, 2010. "Relational contract theory and management contracts: A paradigm for the application of the Theory of the Norms," MPRA Paper 24028, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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