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Electoral incentives in small polities: a case study

Author

Listed:
  • Francesco De Sinopoli

    (Department of Economics (University of Verona))

  • Diego Lubian

    (Department of Economics (University of Verona))

Abstract

It is well known, from the pioneering work of Lizzeri and Persico (2001) on, that in winner-take-all systems office-motivated politicians prefer to underprovide public goods in favor of pork-barrel spending. Believing that similar incentives are present even in small polities, we analyze a policy proposal in a medium-sized Department of Economics obtaining results in line with the empirical literature on government spending.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco De Sinopoli & Diego Lubian, 2020. "Electoral incentives in small polities: a case study," Working Papers 18/2020, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ver:wpaper:18/2020
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "The size and scope of government:: Comparative politics with rational politicians," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 699-735, April.
    2. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March.
    3. Alessandro Gavazza & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2009. "Transparency and Economic Policy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(3), pages 1023-1048.
    4. Robert Deacon, 2009. "Public good provision under dictatorship and democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 241-262, April.
    5. Gerring, John & Thacker, Strom C., 2004. "Political Institutions and Corruption: The Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(2), pages 295-330, April.
    6. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 25-45, March.
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    Keywords

    Polity; Electoral Incentives; Public goods provision;
    All these keywords.

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