IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/van/wpaper/vuecon-sub-19-00013.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Economic Implications of New Technologies for Licensed and Unlicensed Spectrum

Author

Listed:
  • John P. Conley

    (Vanderbilt University)

Abstract

Rapid changes in technology create challenges and opportunities for spectrum regulators. Enabling connectivity and maximizing the value of the very finite amount of bandwidth available will play an increasingly important role in the country's economic development and innovative potential. In this paper, we attempt to clarify the nature of spectrum as an economic resource. We show how and why there will be market failure, and how the tools available to regulators might best be deployed in response. We consider the spectrum needs of emerging technologies and how judicious choices of protocols, regulations, market structures might help satisfy them. In particular, we focus on factors that make licensed or unlicensed approaches the best choice for different use cases. Finally, we discuss the similarities between wireless and wired broadband and what this suggest about net neutrality and market structure in the appendix.

Suggested Citation

  • John P. Conley, 2019. "Economic Implications of New Technologies for Licensed and Unlicensed Spectrum," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 19-00011, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:vuecon-sub-19-00013
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/VUECON-19-00011.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    2. James Andreoni, 1995. "Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(1), pages 1-21.
    3. Conley, John P. & Smith, Stefani C., 2005. "Coasian equilibrium," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 687-704, September.
    4. John P. Conley & Fan‐Chin Kung, 2010. "Private Benefits, Warm Glow, and Reputation in the Free and Open Source Software Production Model," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 665-689, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Aseem Kaul & Jiao Luo, 2018. "An economic case for CSR: The comparative efficiency of for‐profit firms in meeting consumer demand for social goods," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(6), pages 1650-1677, June.
    2. Stavins, Robert, 2004. "Environmental Economics," Working Paper Series rwp04-051, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    3. Antoine Mandel, 2007. "Welfare improvement properties of an allowance market in a production economy," Post-Print halshs-00155803, HAL.
    4. Peifang Yang & Daniel T. Kaffine, 2016. "Community-Based Tradable Permits for Localized Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(4), pages 773-788, December.
    5. Asproudis, Elias & Weyman-Jones, Tom, 2011. "Third parties �participation in tradable permits market. Do we need them?," MPRA Paper 28766, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Murty, Sushama, 2010. "Externalities and fundamental nonconvexities: A reconciliation of approaches to general equilibrium externality modeling and implications for decentralization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 331-353, January.
    7. Kremhelmer, Susanne, 2004. "Fairness, Property Rights, and the Market for Media," Munich Dissertations in Economics 2521, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    8. Revesz, Richard & Stavins, Robert, 2004. "Environmental Law and Policy," Working Paper Series rwp04-023, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    9. Elodie Bertrand, 2019. "Much ado about nothing? The controversy over the validity of the Coase theorem," Post-Print hal-03479468, HAL.
    10. Steven G. Medema, 2020. "The Coase Theorem at Sixty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1045-1128, December.
    11. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    12. Qiuyue Xia & Lu Li & Jie Dong & Bin Zhang, 2021. "Reduction Effect and Mechanism Analysis of Carbon Trading Policy on Carbon Emissions from Land Use," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(17), pages 1-22, August.
    13. Frans P. Vries & Nick Hanley, 2016. "Incentive-Based Policy Design for Pollution Control and Biodiversity Conservation: A Review," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 687-702, April.
    14. Usher, Dan, 2001. "Personal goods, efficiency and the law," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 673-703, November.
    15. George Tridimas & Stanley L. Winer, 2018. "On the Definition and Nature of Fiscal Coercion," Carleton Economic Papers 18-09, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    16. Mario Jametti & Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, 2005. "Assessing the Efficiency of an Insurance Provider—A Measurement Error Approach," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 30(1), pages 15-34, June.
    17. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November.
    18. Stefan Ambec & Yann Kervinio, 2016. "Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 119-155, January.
    19. Liu, Duan & Yu, Nizhou & Wan, Hong, 2022. "Does water rights trading affect corporate investment? The role of resource allocation and risk mitigation channels," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
    20. Delaney, Jason & Jacobson, Sarah, 2014. "Those outsiders: How downstream externalities affect public good provision," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 340-352.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Licensed and Unlicensed Spectrum; Spectrum Allocation; 802.11; WiFi; LTE; LTE-u; Net Neutrality; IoT; Cognitive Radio; Communications Protocols; Public Goods; Externalities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L8 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:vuecon-sub-19-00013. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: John P. Conley (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/index.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.