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Tree-Wise Single Peaked Domains

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  • Stefano Vannucci

Abstract

The present note provides two conditions which are ointly sufficient for a finite family of uniquely topped total pre-orders on a finite set to be tree-wise single peaked - even when it is not line-wise single peaked. One of the two conditions is also a necessary one.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefano Vannucci, 2017. "Tree-Wise Single Peaked Domains," Department of Economics University of Siena 770, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    • Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:770
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    File URL: http://repec.deps.unisi.it/quaderni/770.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chatterji, Shurojit & Sen, Arunava & Zeng, Huaxia, 2016. "A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
    2. Peters, Hans & Roy, Souvik & Sen, Arunava & Storcken, Ton, 2014. "Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 123-127.
    3. Puppe, Clemens, 2018. "The single-peaked domain revisited: A simple global characterization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 55-80.
    4. Demange, Gabrielle, 1982. "Single-peaked orders on a tree," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 389-396, December.
    5. Danilov, Vladimir I., 1994. "The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 123-131, April.
    6. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
    7. Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 408-434, August.
    8. Vannucci, Stefano, 2016. "Weakly unimodal domains, anti-exchange properties, and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 56-67.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tree; betweenness; single peakedness; majority rule; strategy-proofness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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