Institutional Change and Information Production
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Landini, Fabio, 2013. "Institutional change and information production," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(3), pages 257-284, September.
References listed on IDEAS
- Earle, John S. & Pagano, Ugo & Lesi, Maria, 2006.
"Information technology, organizational form, and transition to the market,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 471-489, August.
- John S. Earle & Ugo Pagano & Maria Lesi, "undated". "Information Technology, Organizational Form, and Transition to the Market," Upjohn Working Papers jse20065, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
- John S. Earle & Ugo Pagano & Maria Lesi, 2002. "Information Technology, Organizational Form, and Transition to the Market," Upjohn Working Papers 02-82, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990.
"Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Scholarly Articles 3448675, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Benkler, Yochai, 2002. "Intellectual property and the organization of information production," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 81-107, July.
- Bowles, Samuel, 1985. "The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian, and Marxian Models," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 16-36, March.
- Dow, Gregory K. & Putterman, Louis, 2000. "Why capital suppliers (usually) hire workers: what we know and what we need to know," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 319-336, November.
- Ugo Pagano & Maria Rossi, 2004. "Incomplete Contracts, Intellectual Property and Institutional Complementarities," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 55-76, July.
- Richard Langlois & Giampaolo Garzarelli, 2008.
"Of Hackers and Hairdressers: Modularity and the Organizational Economics of Open-source Collaboration,"
Industry and Innovation, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(2), pages 125-143.
- Richard N. Langlois & Giampaolo Garzarelli, 2008. "Of Hackers and Hairdressers: Modularity and the Organizational Economics of Open-source Collaboration," Working papers 2008-53, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Nuvolari, A., 2003. "Open source software development: some historical perspectives," Working Papers 03.01, Eindhoven Center for Innovation Studies.
- Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972.
"Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
- Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Landini, Fabio, 2012. "Technology, property rights and organizational diversity in the software industry," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 137-150.
- Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2005.
"The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 99-120, Spring.
- Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond," NBER Working Papers 10956, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986.
"The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Bowles,Samuel & Gintis,Herbert & Gustafsson,Bo (ed.), 1993. "Markets and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521432238, October.
- Paul A. David & Francesco Rullani, 2008.
"Dynamics of innovation in an “open source” collaboration environment: lurking, laboring, and launching FLOSS projects on SourceForge,"
Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 17(4), pages 647-710, August.
- Paul David & Francesco Rullani, 2007. "Dynamics of Innovation in an “Open Source” Collaboration Environment: Lurking, Laboring and Launching FLOSS Projects on SourceForge," Discussion Papers 07-022, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Pagano, Ugo & Rowthorn, Robert, 1994. "Ownership, technology and institutional stability," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 221-242, December.
- Craig, Ben & Pencavel, John, 1992. "The Behavior of Worker Cooperatives: The Plywood Companies of the Pacific Northwest," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1083-1105, December.
- Carliss Baldwin & Eric von Hippel, 2011. "Modeling a Paradigm Shift: From Producer Innovation to User and Open Collaborative Innovation," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 22(6), pages 1399-1417, December.
- Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
- Pagano, Ugo, 2011.
"Interlocking complementarities and institutional change,"
Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(3), pages 373-392, September.
- Ugo Pagano, 2010. "Interlocking Complementarities and Institutional Change," Department of Economics University of Siena 598, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Belloc, Filippo & Burdin, Gabriel & Cattani, Luca & Ellis, William & Landini, Fabio, 2022.
"Coevolution of job automation risk and workplace governance,"
Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(3).
- Filippo Belloc & Gabriel Burdin & Luca Cattani & William Ellis & Fabio Landini, 2020. "Coevolution of Job Automation Risk and Workplace Governance," Department of Economics University of Siena 841, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Belloc, Filippo & Burdin, Gabriel & Cattani, Luca & Ellis, William & Landini, Fabio, 2021. "Coevolution of Job Automation Risk and Workplace Governance," IZA Discussion Papers 14788, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Luca Cattani & Stefano Dughera & Fabio Landini, 2023.
"Interlocking complementarities between job design and labour contracts,"
Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 9(2), pages 501-528, July.
- Luca Cattani & Stefano Dughera & Fabio Landini, 2021. "Interlocking complementarities between job design and labour contracts," Discussion Paper series in Regional Science & Economic Geography 2021-13, Gran Sasso Science Institute, Social Sciences, revised Sep 2024.
- Cattani, Luca & Dughera, Stefano & Landini, Fabio, 2021. "Interlocking Complementarities Between Job Design And Labour Contracts," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 202114, University of Turin.
- Roberto Casarin & Niccolò Casnici & Pierpaolo Dondio & Flaminio Squazzoni, 2015. "Back to Basics! The Educational Gap of Online Investors and the Conundrum of Virtual Communities," Journal of Financial Management, Markets and Institutions, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 51-69, June.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Landini, Fabio, 2012. "Technology, property rights and organizational diversity in the software industry," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 137-150.
- Ugo Pagano, 2013.
"Technical assets and property rights,"
Chapters, in: Anna Grandori (ed.), Handbook of Economic Organization, chapter 18,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Ugo Pagano, 2012. "Technical assets and property rights," Department of Economics University of Siena 657, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Gregory K. DOW, 2018. "The Theory Of The Labor-Managed Firm: Past, Present, And Future," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(1), pages 65-86, March.
- Dow,Gregory K., 2019.
"The Labor-Managed Firm,"
Cambridge Books,
Cambridge University Press, number 9781107589650, September.
- Dow,Gregory K., 2018. "The Labor-Managed Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107132979, October.
- Belloc, Filippo & Burdin, Gabriel & Cattani, Luca & Ellis, William & Landini, Fabio, 2022.
"Coevolution of job automation risk and workplace governance,"
Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(3).
- Filippo Belloc & Gabriel Burdin & Luca Cattani & William Ellis & Fabio Landini, 2020. "Coevolution of Job Automation Risk and Workplace Governance," Department of Economics University of Siena 841, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Belloc, Filippo & Burdin, Gabriel & Cattani, Luca & Ellis, William & Landini, Fabio, 2021. "Coevolution of Job Automation Risk and Workplace Governance," IZA Discussion Papers 14788, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Gregory Dow, 2001.
"Allocating Control over Firms: Stock Markets versus Membership Markets,"
Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 18(2), pages 201-218, March.
- Gregory K. Dow, 2000. "Allocating Control Over Firms: Stock Markets Versus Membership Markets," Discussion Papers dp00-03, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, revised Feb 2000.
- Nicita, Antonio & Pagano, Ugo, 2016. "Finance-technology complementarities: An organizational equilibria approach," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 43-51.
- repec:bla:annpce:v:89:y:2018:i:1:p:65-86 is not listed on IDEAS
- Dow, Gregory K. & Putterman, Louis, 2000. "Why capital suppliers (usually) hire workers: what we know and what we need to know," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 319-336, November.
- Chong-En Bai & Chenggang Xu, 2001.
"Ownership, Incentives and Monitoring,"
STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series
413, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Bai, Chong-En & Xu, Cheng-Gang, 2001. "Ownership, incentives and monitoring," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3750, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Albanese, Marina & Navarra, Cecilia & Tortia, Ermanno C., 2015.
"Employer moral hazard and wage rigidity. The case of worker owned and investor owned firms,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 227-237.
- Marina Albanese & Cecilia Navarra & Ermanno Tortia, 2013. "Employer moral hazard and wage rigidity. The case of worker-owned and investor-owned firms," DEM Discussion Papers 2013/02, Department of Economics and Management.
- Ermanno Celeste Tortia, 2013. "Employer moral hazard and wage rigidity. The case of worker-owned and investor-owned firms," Econometica Working Papers wp46, Econometica.
- Leshui He, 2010. "The Ownership of the Firm under A Property Rights Approach," Working papers 2010-23, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta, 2010. "Editors’ Introduction," Chapters, in: Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Kim, Jongwook & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2008. "A Strategic Theory of the Firm as a Nexus of Incomplete Contracts: A Property Rights Approach," Working Papers 08-0108, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998.
"Power in a Theory of the Firm,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, "undated". "Power in a Theory of the Firm," CRSP working papers 335, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
- Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 1998. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 1777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1997. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," NBER Working Papers 6274, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dietrich, Diemo & Jindra, Björn, 2010. "Corporate governance in the multinational enterprise: A financial contracting perspective," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 446-456, October.
- Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2010.
"Property Rights and Economic Development,"
Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4525-4595,
Elsevier.
- Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2009. "Property Rights and EconomicDevelopment," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 006, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Besley, Tim & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2009. "Property Rights and Economic Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 7243, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2009. "Property rights and economic development," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25428, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Yildiz, Özgür, 2016. "Public-private partnerships, incomplete contracts, and distributional fairness – when payments matter," MPRA Paper 74552, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Andersson Fredrik, 2011.
"Make-or-Buy Decisions and the Manipulability of Performance Measures,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-30, December.
- Andersson, Fredrik, 2009. "Make-or-buy Decisions and the Manipulability of Performance Measures," Working Paper Series 815, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Andersson, Fredrik, 2009. "Make-or-buy decisions and the manipulability of performance measures," Working Papers 2009:16, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 20 Nov 2009.
- Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2012.
"Hold-up and externality: the firm as a nexus of incomplete rights?,"
International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 59(2), pages 157-174, July.
- Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2012. "Hold-up and Externality: the Firm as a Nexus of Incomplete Rights?," Department of Economics University of Siena 638, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Bernard Baudry & Virgile Chassagnon, 2012.
"The vertical network organization as a specific governance structure: what are the challenges for incomplete contracts theories and what are the theoretical implications for the boundaries of the (hub,"
Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(2), pages 285-303, May.
- Bernard Baudry & Virgile Chassagnon, 2012. "The vertical network organization as a specific governance structure : what are the challenges for incomplete contracts theories and what are the theoretical implications for the boundaries of the (hu," Post-Print halshs-00683231, HAL.
More about this item
Keywords
peer production; organizational equilibria; institutional complementarities; transaction costs;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
- L17 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Open Source Products and Markets
- O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CUL-2012-07-14 (Cultural Economics)
- NEP-HIS-2012-07-14 (Business, Economic and Financial History)
- NEP-ICT-2012-07-14 (Information and Communication Technologies)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:645. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Fabrizio Becatti (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/desieit.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.