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The Libertarian Identification Rule in Finite Atomistic Lattices

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  • Stefano Vannucci

Abstract

Collective Identification Procedures (CIPs) model admission rules regulating membership in associations, communities and clubs: the Libertarian identification rule Fl is the CIP which essentially relies on self-certification. This paper studies Fl in an arbitrary finite atomistic lattice, allowing an unified treatment of collective identification problems with either exogenous or endogenous choice of classification labels. An elementary axiomatic characterization of Fl in that general setting is provided and contrasted with previously known characterizations which only work in more specialized (e.g. distributive) lattices, and are therefore confined to collective identification problems with exogenously fixed labels. Non-manipulability properties of Fl on a certain simple restricted domain are also considered and shown to hold for any finite atomistic lattice

Suggested Citation

  • Stefano Vannucci, 2008. "The Libertarian Identification Rule in Finite Atomistic Lattices," Department of Economics University of Siena 526, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    • Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:526
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Samet, Dov & Schmeidler, David, 2003. "Between liberalism and democracy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 213-233, June.
    2. Nicolas, Houy, 2007. ""I want to be a J!": Liberalism in group identification problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 59-70, July.
    3. Monjardet, B., 1990. "Arrowian characterizations of latticial federation consensus functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 51-71, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christopher Chambers & Alan Miller, 2011. "Rules for aggregating information," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(1), pages 75-82, January.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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