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Central bank communication and crowding out of private information in an experimental asset market

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  • M. Middeldorp
  • S. Rosenkranz

Abstract

Theoretical results from previous work, presented in Kool, Middeldorp and Rosenkranz (2007), suggest that central bank communication crowds out private information acquisition and that this effect can lead to a deterioration of the ability of financial markets to predict future policy interest rates. We examine this result in an experimental asset market that closely follows the theoretical model. Crowding out of information acquisition takes place and, where this crowding out is most rapid, there is deterioration of the market’s predictive ability. This supports the theoretical result that central bank communication can actually make it more difficult for financial markets to predict future policy rates.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Middeldorp & S. Rosenkranz, 2008. "Central bank communication and crowding out of private information in an experimental asset market," Working Papers 08-26, Utrecht School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:use:tkiwps:0826
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. C.J.M. Kool & S. Rosenkranz & M. Middeldorp, 2007. "Listening Without Understanding: Central Bank Transparency, Financial Markets and the Crowding Out of Private Information," Working Papers 07-19, Utrecht School of Economics.
    2. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    3. Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 393-408, June.
    4. Martin Barner & Francesco Feri & Charles R. Plott, 2005. "On the microstructure of price determination and information aggregation with sequential and asymmetric information arrival in an experimental asset market," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 73-107, January.
    5. Elton, Edwin J, et al, 1993. "Efficiency with Costly Information: A Reinterpretation of Evidence from Managed Portfolios," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 1-22.
    6. Diamond, Douglas W, 1985. "Optimal Release of Information by Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1071-1094, September.
    7. repec:use:tkiwps:2525 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. David H. Romer & Christina D. Romer, 2000. "Federal Reserve Information and the Behavior of Interest Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 429-457, June.
    9. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    10. M. Middeldorp & S. Rosenkranz, 2008. "Information acquisition in an experimental asset market," Working Papers 08-25, Utrecht School of Economics.
    11. Copeland, Thomas E & Friedman, Daniel, 1992. "The Market Value of Information: Some Experimental Results," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 241-266, April.
    12. repec:pri:cepsud:161blinder is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Menno Middeldorp, 2011. "FOMC communication policy and the accuracy of Fed Funds futures," Staff Reports 491, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    2. Menno Middeldorp, 2011. "Central bank transparency, the accuracy of professional forecasts, and interest rate volatility," Staff Reports 496, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    3. Ma, Yong & Li, Shushu, 2015. "Bayesian estimation of China's monetary policy transparency: A New Keynesian approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 236-248.

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    Keywords

    Experimental Economics; Private Information Acquisition; Information and Financial Market Efficiency; Central bank transparency and communication;
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