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Conflicting claims problem associated with cost sharing of a network

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  • Giménez Gómez, José M. (José Manuel)
  • Subiza, Begoña
  • Peris, Josep E.

Abstract

A minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problem analyzes the way to efficiently connect individuals to a source when they are located at different places. Once the efficient tree is obtained, the question on how allocating the total cost among the involved agents defines, in a natural way, a confliicting claims situation. For instance, we may consider the endowment as the total cost of the network, whereas for each individual her claim is the maximum amount she will be allocated, that is, her connection cost to the source. Obviously, we have a confliicting claims problem, so we can apply claims rules in order to obtain an allocation of the total cost. Nevertheless, the allocation obtained by using claims rules might not satisfy some appealing properties (in particular, it does not belong to the core of the associated cooperative game). We will define other natural claims problems that appear if we analyze the maximum and minimum amount that an individual should pay in order to support the minimum cost tree. Keywords: Minimum cost spanning tree problem, Claims problem, Core JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

Suggested Citation

  • Giménez Gómez, José M. (José Manuel) & Subiza, Begoña & Peris, Josep E., 2014. "Conflicting claims problem associated with cost sharing of a network," Working Papers 2072/242273, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/242273
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gustavo Bergantiños & Leticia Lorenzo, 2004. "A non-cooperative approach to the cost spanning tree problem," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 59(3), pages 393-403, July.
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    6. Trudeau, Christian, 2012. "A new stable and more responsive cost sharing solution for minimum cost spanning tree problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 402-412.
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    Cited by:

    1. José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez & Josep E Peris & Begoña Subiza, 2020. "An egalitarian approach for sharing the cost of a spanning tree," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(7), pages 1-14, July.
    2. Giménez-Gómez, José M. & Peris, Josep E. & Subiza, Begoña, 2016. "A `Solidarity' Approach to the Problem of Sharing a Network Cost," QM&ET Working Papers 16-5, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Jocs cooperatius; Economia del benestar; Elecció social; 33 - Economia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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