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Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

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Abstract

Two main school choice mechanisms have attracted the attention in the literature: Boston and deferred acceptance (DA). The question arises on the ex-ante welfare implications when the game is played by participants that vary in terms of their strategic sophistication. Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (2011) have shown that the chances of naive participants getting into a good school are higher under the Boston mechanism than under DA, and some naive participants are actually better off. In this note we show that these results can be extended to show that, under the veil of ignorance, i.e. students not yet knowing their utility values, all naive students may prefer to adopt the Boston mechanism.

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  • Jose Apesteguia & Miguel A. Ballester, 2011. "Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice," Economics Working Papers 1280, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1280
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    1. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sonmez, 2008. "Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1636-1652, September.
    2. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda, 2011. "Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 399-410, February.
    3. Jose Apesteguia & Miguel A. Ballester & Rosa Ferrer, 2011. "On the Justice of Decision Rules," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 78(1), pages 1-16.
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    Cited by:

    1. Papi, Mauro, 2013. "Satisficing and maximizing consumers in a monopolistic screening model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 385-389.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    School Choice; Naive Players; Welfare; Veil of Ignorance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics

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