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Profit and Non-Profit Maximising Network Density, Membership Fees and Service in Monopolistic and Duopolistic Framework

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Abstract

Network density, membership fees and service are analytically related to factors such as the size of the target population, the distribution of ability to enjoy the networl's service within target population, the tax-regbate on membership payment, the service production costs, which are increased by congestion or reduced by agglomeration, and the network organisational costs. The analysis is conducted for the case of budget-balancing and density-targeting networks.

Suggested Citation

  • Levy, A., 1999. "Profit and Non-Profit Maximising Network Density, Membership Fees and Service in Monopolistic and Duopolistic Framework," Economics Working Papers wp99-2, School of Economics, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia.
    • Handle: RePEc:uow:depec1:wp99-2
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    File URL: http://www.uow.edu.au/content/groups/public/@web/@commerce/@econ/documents/doc/uow012250.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Cohen, Daniel R. & Zilberman, David, 1997. "Actual Versus Stated Willingness To Pay: A Comment," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 22(2), pages 1-6, December.
    4. Dutta, Bhaskar & Mutuswami, Suresh, 1997. "Stable Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 322-344, October.
      • Dutta, Bhaskar & Mutuswami, Suresh, 1996. "Stable Networks," Working Papers 971, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    5. Amnon Levy, 1998. "A Theoretical Analysis of Trade Union Membership Fees, Bargaining Power, Wage Rate and Unemployment," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(4), pages 404-413, December.
    6. repec:bla:ausecp:v:37:y:1998:i:4:p:404-13 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    ENTERPRISES ; INDUSTRY ; MEMBERSHIP;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

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