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Contract clientelism: How infrastructure contracts fund vote-buying

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Listed:
  • Alisha Holland
  • Will Freeman

Abstract

Where does the money come from to buy votes? We argue that an important source of funds for vote-buying comes from 'contract clientelism', or the provision of public contracts to private firms in exchange for campaign donations. Using quantitative data on Colombian infrastructure contracts, we demonstrate that municipalities exhibit an 'electoral contracting cycle' in which incumbents assign low-quality contracts while on the campaign trail. Contract manipulations are more common in municipalities with higher reports of clientelist activity.

Suggested Citation

  • Alisha Holland & Will Freeman, 2021. "Contract clientelism: How infrastructure contracts fund vote-buying," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2021-155, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2021-155
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    File URL: https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/Publications/Working-paper/PDF/wp2021-155-contract-clientelism-how-infrastructure-contracts-fund-vote-buying.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ernesto Calvo & Maria Victoria Murillo, 2004. "Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(4), pages 742-757, October.
    2. Claessens, Stijn & Feijen, Erik & Laeven, Luc, 2008. "Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 554-580, June.
    3. De La O,Ana Lorena, 2015. "Crafting Policies to End Poverty in Latin America," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107089488, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Víctor Saavedra & Andrés Felipe Soto & Miguel Ángel Carvajal, 2023. "Análisis de la Política de Financiación Electoral en Colombia," Informes de Investigación 20741, Fedesarrollo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contracts; vote-buying; Clientelism; Infrastructure; Colombia; Public goods; Firms;
    All these keywords.

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