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Pairwise interactive knowledge and Nash equilibrium

Author

Listed:
  • Bach, C.W.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Tsakas, E.

    (Microeconomics & Public Economics)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Bach, C.W. & Tsakas, E., 2012. "Pairwise interactive knowledge and Nash equilibrium," Research Memorandum 008, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2012008
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2012008
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ben Polak, 1999. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 673-676, May.
    2. Robert Aumann & Adam Brandenburger, 2014. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 5, pages 113-136, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Barelli, Paulo, 2009. "Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 363-375, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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