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Country Ownership Of Reform Programmes And The Implications For Conditionality

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  • Omotunde E.G. JOHNSON

Abstract

The essence of ownership is the acceptance of full responsibility for the consequences of a programme. Ownership matters because of the expectation that programme design will be more appropriate and country authorities will be resolute in taking steps domestically to ensure full implementation of the programme. The steps include seeking proper domestic legitimation, which will prevent certain "political economy" factors from disrupting programme implementation. That programme success is correlated with degree of ownership and that ownership is correlated with implementation, which in turn is correlated with programme legitimation, are supported by available evidence. Ex ante selectivity is easily made preferable to ex post, and for financial support a recipient country must satisfy the donor country or organization team as to the reality of ownership, soundness of the programme (policies and outcomes), and adequate implementation capacity. From a positive perspective, forces operating on both the demand and supply side of aid should inevitably bring about a new equilibrium regime in the aid relationship that excludes traditional conditionality.

Suggested Citation

  • Omotunde E.G. JOHNSON, 2005. "Country Ownership Of Reform Programmes And The Implications For Conditionality," G-24 Discussion Papers 35, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
    • Handle: RePEc:unc:g24pap:35
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gammage Clair, 2010. "A 'Sustainability Impact Assessment' of the Economic Partnership Agreements: Challenging the Participatory Process," The Law and Development Review, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 107-134, September.
    2. Dimitris P. SKALKOS, 2018. "Studying the political economy of reforms: The Greek case, 2010-2017," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania / Editura Economica, vol. 0(2(615), S), pages 163-186, Summer.

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