Advocates
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Other versions of this item:
- Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1999. "Advocates," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 1-39, February.
References listed on IDEAS
- repec:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17678/ is not listed on IDEAS
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- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
- Krehbiel, Keith, 1990. "Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(1), pages 149-163, March.
- Steven Shavell, 1994. "Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 20-36, Spring.
Citations
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Cited by:
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- Kim, Chulyoung, 2015. "An Economic Rationale for Dismissing Low-Quality Experts in Trial," MPRA Paper 69620, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Anke Gerber & Corina Haita‐Falah & Andreas Lange, 2018.
"The Agency Of Politics And Science,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(3), pages 1543-1561, July.
- Haita-Falah, Corina & Gerber, Anke & Lange, Andreas, 2015. "The Agency of Politics and Science," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113227, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2017.
"Repeated Lobbying By Commercial Lobbyists And Special Interests,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1868-1897, October.
- Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2016. "Repeated Lobbying by Commercial Lobbyists and Special Interests," CESifo Working Paper Series 5809, CESifo.
- Chulyoung Kim, 2014. "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures with Information Acquisition," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(4), pages 767-803.
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