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Three forms of BT Separation: Objectives, solutions and effects

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  • Richard Cadman

    (SPC Network Ltd)

Abstract

Following its latest strategic review of the digital communications sector, Ofcom has proposed that BT’s access services division, Openreach, becomes a subsidiary of BT plc. BT has put forward a counter proposal it terms Enhanced Functional Separation. This paper reviews the two proposals and compares them with the current situation. It finds that the differences between BT’s and Ofcom’s proposals are less substantive that might appear at first sight. The paper also considers the whether the incentives for BT to invest in taking fibre access networks closer to the customer are likely to be any different under the two proposals. Again, the paper is sceptical that the legal separation proposed by Ofcom would result in greater incentives than would occur under Enhanced Functional Separation.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Cadman, 2016. "Three forms of BT Separation: Objectives, solutions and effects," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2016-10, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    • Handle: RePEc:uea:ueaccp:2016_10
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. repec:bla:jindec:v:49:y:2001:i:3:p:319-33 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Anthea Paelo & Genna Robb, 2020. "Comparative approaches to key issues in the economic regulation of telecommunications markets in South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2020-84, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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