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Presentación de la política de exoneraciones de aportes a la seguridad social en Uruguay

Author

Listed:
  • Marisa Bucheli

    (Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República)

  • Andrés Vigna

    (Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República)

Abstract

In Uruguay, the payroll tax rates that take the form of mandatory contributions to the social security system paid by employers differ among industries. This is the result of different policies. Since the 1950s, the law has permitted exemptions based on three criteria: a) the “general interest”, which led to some firms enjoying discretional subsidies; b) to subsidize the employment of some specific groups; c) to smooth the consequences of adverse macroeconomic shocks on employment. In this document we present the norms about exemptions, we describe the characteristics of the subsidised jobs and we report the results of Uruguayan studies about the relation between payroll taxes and employment.

Suggested Citation

  • Marisa Bucheli & Andrés Vigna, 2006. "Presentación de la política de exoneraciones de aportes a la seguridad social en Uruguay," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1206, Department of Economics - dECON.
    • Handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:1206
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    File URL: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/2054
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Burdin, Gabriel, 2013. "Are Worker-Managed Firms Really More Likely to Fail?," IZA Discussion Papers 7412, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Gabriel Burdín, 2014. "Are Worker-Managed Firms More Likely to Fail Than Conventional Enterprises? Evidence from Uruguay," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 67(1), pages 202-238, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    payroll taxes;

    JEL classification:

    • J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
    • J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy

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