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Satisfaction with Democracy in Latin America: Do the Characteristics of the Political System Matter?

Author

Listed:
  • Selim Jürgen Ergun

    (Middle East Technical University, Northern Cyprus Campus)

  • M. Fernanda Rivas

    (Middle East Technical University, Northern Cyprus Campus)

  • Máximo Rossi

    (Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the impact that the rules and characteristics of the political system have on satisfaction with democracy in Latin America. Using individual level survey data provided by Latinobarometer and controlling for both personal characteristics and macroeconomic variables, we find that the rules and characteristics of the political system do matter: Satisfaction with democracy is higher in countries that use a proportional electoral rule for choosing the legislature, where voting is not enforced, and in countries with a federal system. The age of democracy has a negative impact on satisfaction with democracy while the electoral rule used to choose the president does not matter. On the economic side, we find that personal assessments of the economy impact more on satisfaction with democracy than actual macroeconomic data.

Suggested Citation

  • Selim Jürgen Ergun & M. Fernanda Rivas & Máximo Rossi, 2016. "Satisfaction with Democracy in Latin America: Do the Characteristics of the Political System Matter?," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 0816, Department of Economics - dECON.
    • Handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:0816
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    File URL: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/8427
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    satisfaction with democracy; Latin America; electoral system;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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